REMEDIES SYMPOSIUM

CONTEMPT FINES AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
By Professor John Sanchez*
The Eleventh Amendment confirms the sovereign status of the States
by shielding them from suits by individuals absent their consent. 1 The
Supreme Court has made clear that under the Eleventh Amendment,
prospective relief is recoverable against a state official acting in his or her
official capacity 2 while retrospective remedies are not recoverable. 3
Eleventh Amendment immunity is triggered when a declaration or
injunction calls for the payment of state funds as a form of compensation
for past breaches of legal duties by state officials. 4 So, for example, money
damages awards are barred by the Eleventh Amendment but injunctive
relief is not.
There are three types of contempt: two civil, compensatory and
coercive, and one criminal. Fines may be imposed in all three types of
contempt. While there is consensus that both compensatory and criminal
contempt fines are retrospective and therefore unavailable under the
Eleventh Amendment, courts are in disarray over how to label civil
coercive contempt fines—although clearly prospective, coercive fines can
morph into criminal fines and such fines may result in money coming out
of state funds. When such fines are deemed ancillary to prospective

* John Sanchez, Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern College of Law. B.A., Pomona College, 1974;
J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1977; L.L.M., 1984, Georgetown University Law School.
1. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996), superseded by statute as stated in
Huff v. Office of the Sheriff, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161954 (W.D. Va. Nov. 13, 2013).
2. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), superseded by statute as stated in Presbyterian
Church (U.S.A) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989). The rationale of Ex parte Young,
however, is inapplicable to suits brought against state officials on the basis of state law, whether
prospective or retroactive. See also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106
(1984), superseded by statute as stated in Raygor v. Univ. of Minn., 604 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. App.
2000).
3. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974), rev’d by Jordan v. Trainor, 551 F.2d 152
(7th Cir. 1977).
4. See, e.g., Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102-03.
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equitable relief, courts generally enforce such fines against state officials
acting in their official capacities.
Although other remedies, such as reinstatement 5 and declarative
relief, are also prospective remedies for purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment, 6 this essay focuses solely on fines flowing from violations
of injunctions which themselves can be labeled mandatory or prohibitory.
Problems arise, however, because there is overlap between compensatory
and coercive civil contempt sanctions and between coercive and criminal
contempt sanctions in that each type of contempt contains remedial and
punitive traits to varying degrees.
This essay begins by looking at exceptions to Eleventh Amendment
immunity enjoyed by states. Next, I survey the three types of contempt,
concentrating on the fine sanction available under each type of contempt
rather than on imprisonment as a contempt sanction—imprisonment does
not trigger Eleventh Amendment immunity. For good measure, I review
the major Supreme Court cases that shed light on distinguishing between
civil and criminal contempt and examine the myriad theories aimed at
aiding courts in deciding whether the contempt before them is civil or
criminal (or both). While most cases and law review articles focus on the
more stringent constitutional procedures and protections available for
criminal contempt than for civil contempt, this essay looks at the
differences for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
I. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY ENJOYED BY STATES FROM
MONETARY DAMAGES AWARDS
The Eleventh Amendment applies to a suit brought against a state by
one of its own citizens, as well as to a suit brought by a citizen of another
state. 7 The Amendment applies only to those suits in which the state is a
party on the record. However,

5. However, front pay is unavailable as an alternative to reinstatement in an official-capacity
suit against a state official where it will be paid from a state treasury. See, e.g., Nelson v. University
of Texas at Dallas, 535 F.3d 318, 322 (5th Cir. 2008). By contrast, wages sought between the
reinstatement order and actual reinstatement, are treated as prospective and thus not barred by Ex
parte Young. See, e.g., Barnes v. Bosley, 828 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1987).
6. Requests for reinstatement constitute prospective equitable relief within the definition of
Ex parte Young. Just because reinstatement would require the state to pay a former employee’s salary
does not trigger Eleventh Amendment protection. “Such an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a
permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the principle announced in Ex parte Young.” See,
e.g., Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. College, 768 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2014) (just because the reinstatement
would require the state to pay Lane’s salary did not trigger Eleventh Amendment protection).
7. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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It is the settled doctrine of this court that a suit against individuals, for
the purpose of preventing them, as officers of a state, from enforcing an
unconstitutional enactment, to the injury of the rights of the plaintiff, is
not a suit against the state within the meaning of the Amendment. 8

The Supreme Court has expanded the scope of Eleventh Amendment
immunity to include claims filed in state, as well as federal court.9
There are three types of exceptions to Eleventh Amendment
immunity: (1) states are not immune from suit by the federal government
when Congress has stripped them of immunity under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment; 10 (2) when the state has consented to suit by
accepting federal money conditioned upon consent (e.g., the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title IX, and Title VII.); 11 and (3) the Ex parte
Young 12 exception, which permits official-capacity suits where the
plaintiff seeks “prospective equitable relief to end continuing violations
of federal law.” 13 This essay sets its sights solely on the Ex parte Young
exception to the Eleventh Amendment. The theory behind Ex parte Young
is that an unconstitutional statute is void 14 and therefore does not impart
to [the official] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority
of the United States.” 15 Ex parte Young has been applied in cases in which
violations of federal law by a state official are ongoing as opposed to cases
in which federal law has been violated one time or over a period of time
in the past. Ex parte Young also held that the Eleventh Amendment does
8. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518-19 (1898). See Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)
(money damages are permissible against the state officer, so long as the damages are attributable to
the officer himself and are not paid from the state treasury). However, even if the official is entitled
to indemnification from the state, it is not considered a suit against the state. E.g., Ashker v. California
Dept. of Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 395 (9th Cir. 1997).
9. Alden v. Main, 527 U.S. 706, 711 (1999).
10. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1977) (“The Eleventh Amendment, and
the principle of state sovereignty, which it embodies . . . are necessarily limited by the enforcement
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
11. Under the Spending Clause waiver theory, a state may waive its sovereign immunity by
accepting federal funds. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 note 1 (1985),
superseded by statute as stated in Sacca v. Buffalo State College, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9134
(W.D.N.Y Feb. 13, 2004), superseded by statute as stated in Ohta v. Muraski, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12693 (D. Conn. Aug. 19, 1993) (“A state may effectuate a waiver of its constitutional immunity
by. . .waiving its immunity to suit in the context of the particular federal program.”). Removal of a
case by a state from state court to a federal court also amounts to a waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Lapides v. Board of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002).
12. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
13. Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (1999). (“We do not . . .question the
continuing validity of the Ex parte Young doctrine.”) See also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S.
261, 269 (1997).
14. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159.
15. Id. at 160.
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not prevent federal courts from granting prospective injunctive relief to
prevent a continuing violation of federal law. 16 Thus, Ex parte Young
applies to cases in which the relief against the state official directly ends
the violation of federal law, as opposed to cases in which that relief is
intended indirectly to encourage compliance with federal law through
deterrence or simply to compensate the victim. “Remedies designed to
end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the
federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law. But compensatory
or deterrence interest are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the
Eleventh Amendment.” 17 “[I]ndividual suits that seek prospective relief
for ongoing violations of federal law. . .may be levied against state
officials.” 18
A.

Ancillary Monetary Relief

Another well-recognized exception to the Eleventh Amendment that
bears on the differences between prospective and retrospective relief is
known as ancillary monetary relief. For example, in Libby v. Marshall, 19
the court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent a court
from entering an injunction requiring state officials to spend state funds
to improve prison conditions in order to comply with a prior preliminary
injunction imposing a limit on the jail’s population. The court referred to
the additional relief as ancillary to a “substantive prospective injunction”
and necessary to ensure future compliance with the prior injunction. 20 In
Milliken v. Bradley, the Supreme Court noted that the Eleventh
Amendment “permits federal courts to enjoin state officials to conform
their conduct to requirements of federal law, notwithstanding a direct and
substantial impact on the state treasury.” 21
Cases that involve attorney fees yield yet another example of
ancillary monetary relief recoverable from the state despite the Eleventh
Amendment. In Hutto v. Finney, the Supreme Court ruled that the “line
between retroactive and prospective relief cannot be so rigid that it defeats
the effective enforcement of prospective relief.” 22 In Hutto, plaintiffs were
awarded attorney’s fees, paid for by the state, rooted on the bad faith
16. Id. at 155-56, 159.
17. Papassan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986).
18. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 492 (11th Cir. 1999). See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at
159.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Libby v. Marshall, 653 F. Supp. 359 (D. Mass. 1986).
Id. at 363.
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977).
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690 (1979).
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refusal of a litigant to obey a court order. The Court compared the award
to a civil contempt fine and made clear that the award was “properly
treated as ancillary to the federal court’s power to impose injunctive
relief.” 23
B.

Injunctions

An injunction is an equitable remedy available only when the legal
remedy is inadequate. While the inadequacy of the legal remedy may be
proved many ways, the most common is to show that irreparable harm
will result unless the court issues the injunction. Injunctive relief may be
cast as either a retrospective or prospective remedy, 24 depending on
whether the injunction serves to cure a past wrong or weighs on future
relations between the parties. Injunctions cannot be issued against the
state—only against the official-capacity-state-officer defendant.
Confusion arises, however, when a court issues injunctive relief
prohibiting future conduct to remedy past violations.
Equity acts in personam and enforces its decrees through contempt.
Equitable remedies, especially injunctions, are enforced against the
person of the defendant, either by fine, imprisonment, or both. Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 65(d), governing the elements necessary for an
enforceable injunction, requires specificity: “[the] command of specificity
is a reflection of the seriousness of the consequences which may flow
from a violation of an injunctive order.” 25 An injunction must be framed
so that those enjoined know exactly what conduct the court has prohibited
and what steps they must take to conform their conduct to the law. 26 For
example, injunctions which merely say “obey the law” are
unenforceable. 27
The distinction between preliminary and permanent injunctions may
also bear on whether relief is prospective or retrospective: a permanent
injunction does not become prospective merely because it is intended to
redress past violations of an earlier preliminary injunction. Declarative
relief and reinstatement are two other prospective, equitable remedies
available against state officials in federal court despite the Eleventh
Amendment. 28 Plaintiffs’ efforts to twist the facts to turn retrospective
23. Id. at 691.
24. A law is prospective when it applies only to cases which are filed after its enactment.
25. Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1978).
26. Int’l Longshoremen’s Assoc. v. Phila. Marine Trade Assoc., 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967).
27. See, e.g., Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1201 (11th Cir. 1999).
28. However, when issuance of a declarative judgment would have the same effect as an award
of damages or restitution by the federal court, it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Green v.
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relief into prospective relief have been unavailing. For example, in 2000,
the Eleventh Circuit ruled:
[W]e are aware of no federal court that has upheld against Eleventh
Amendment scrutiny a final judgment requiring a state to pay money for
illegal conduct which pre-dates the judgment on the theory that the
conduct violated an earlier preliminary injunction and therefore the
remedy was prospective. 29

C.

Monetary Damages

Monetary damages, by contrast, are a legal remedy measured by the
plaintiff’s loss. Damages are retrospective in tort cases where they aim to
restore the plaintiff to his/her pre-tort position. Similarly, fines in
compensatory civil contempt cases are retrospective in that they aim to
compensate the plaintiff for past injuries sustained. If the prospective
relief sought is “measured in terms of a monetary loss resulting from a
past breach of a legal duty,” it is the functional equivalent of monetary
damages and Ex parte Young does not apply. 30
Judgements that result in monetary damages, unlike equitable
decrees, are enforced three ways: by (1) judgment liens, (2) writs of
execution, or (3) garnishment. The law acts in rem; equity acts in
personam. Suits seeking retrospective equitable restitution are also barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. 31
II. CONTEMPT
Section 17 of the First Judiciary Act made clear that federal courts
“shall have power to. . . punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion
of said courts, all contempt of authority of any cause or hearing before the
same.” 32 The authority to hold individuals in contempt of court is one of
the least regulated areas of judicial power. 33 It is essentially unlimited
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985).
29. Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. State of Fla. Dept. of Health and Rehab. Serv., 225
F.3d 1208, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000). See Kostok v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Any claim
for retroactive monetary relief, under any name, is barred . . . . When state funds are awarded to
compensate for past wrongdoing by state officials, or to deter future wrongdoing, the Eleventh
Amendment bars the payment as retrospective.”).
30. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986)
(“Compensatory or deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh
Amendment.”).
31. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
32. Establishment of the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, §17, 83, 1 Stat. 73, (1789).
33. “[W]hile the exercise of the contempt power is subject to reasonable [legislative]
regulation, the attributes that inhere in that power and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated
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power granted to the judge and therefore there is grave danger of bias
stemming from the court’s conflicted role in vindicating its own authority.
“The traditional justification for the relative breadth of the contempt
power has been necessity.” 34 “Few legal concepts have bedeviled courts,
judges, lawyers, and legal commentators more than contempt of court.”35
The contempt powers fuse legislative, executive and judicial powers and
is therefore subject to abuse.
Courts use contempt to control disruptive or disrespectful courtroom
behavior, to compel testimony by reluctant witnesses, to enforce child
support and alimony awards, to ensure obedience to injunctions in
private law disputes, to police behavior in labor-management relations,
and to enforce structural injunctions. 36

A recurring problem, when it comes to distinguishing between civil
and criminal contempt, is that “the nature and character of a contempt
proceeding, whether civil or criminal, is determined at its end in the stage
of review, rather than, as it should be . . . at the beginning.” 37 As the Fifth
Circuit said:
The simple fact is that no one, simply no one, is able to determine
whether this was begun, tried, or ended as a case for criminal contempt,
civil contempt, or both, or whether some place down the trail, begun as
one, it transmuted into the other. This is, of course, one thing about
which there may not be any doubt if a contempt order is to stand. 38

A court has power to hold a party in civil contempt when (1) there is
a clear and unambiguous court order; (2) there is clear and convincing
proof of noncompliance; and (3) the contemnor has not attempted to
comply in a reasonably diligent manner. 39 By contrast, to hold a
contemnor in criminal contempt, the court must prove noncompliance
beyond a reasonable doubt.
A.

Contempt Governed by State Statute

When a State’s proceedings are involved, state law provides strong
guidance about whether or not the State is exercising its authority “in a
nor rendered practically inoperative. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924).
34. Int’l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994).
35. Id. at 827n.3.
36. West’s (R) Pennsylvania Practice Series TM 16 PAPRAC § 13:1.
37. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 368 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
38. Clark v. Boynton, 362 F.2d 992, 994 (5th Cir.1966). See also Cliett v. Hammonds, 305
F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1952).
39. Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. N.Y. 1996).
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nonpunitive, noncriminal manner,” and how one who challenges the
State’s classification of the relief imposed, as “civil” or “criminal,” may
be required to show “the clearest proof” that it is not correct as a matter
of federal law. 40 Courts defer to a legislature’s determination whether a
sanction is civil or criminal. 41 By contrast, “when a single judge, rather
than a legislature, declares a particular sanction to be civil or criminal,
such deference is less appropriate.” 42 This essay confines itself to nonlegislative contempt sanctions resting upon a court’s inherent power to
identify, prosecute, adjudicate, and sanction the contumacious conduct.
B.

Direct v Indirect Contempt

Direct contempt take place in the courtroom while indirect occur
outside the courtroom. A judge enjoys summary power in the face of
direct contempt, justified by the judge’s personal observation of the
contumacious conduct. Sanctions for direct contempt may be civil or
criminal. Summary punishment for direct contempt is an exception to the
general rule that criminal sanctions may not be imposed without affording
the accused all the protections of the Bill of Rights. 43 More procedural
rights are granted in cases of indirect contempt than in direct. While I can
imagine situations where a state attorney might be held in direct contempt,
thus triggering the Eleventh Amendment if civil or criminal fines are
imposed, this essay focuses on fines imposed for indirect contempt of
court.
C.

Contempt Sanctions

The sole sanction available for compensatory civil contempt is a fine
payable to the plaintiff. This fine is clearly retrospective and resembles
monetary damages. For this reason, compensatory civil contempt fines are
not recoverable against a state official acting in her official capacity
because of the Eleventh Amendment. Civil coercive contempt sanctions
come in the form of fines and/or imprisonment.44 Both sanctions are
40. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1986).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980).
42. Int’l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 838 (1994).
43. See, e.g., Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). Even where the contempt is direct,
however, courts may not impose severe criminal sanctions without a jury trial. See also Bloom v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 109-10 (1968).
44. Where a recalcitrant witness is imprisoned for coercive contempt, imprisonment cannot
continue beyond the time when the ordered testimony is useful. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S.
364, 371 (1966). Similarly, the contemnor cannot be held once the plaintiff’s underlying action has
been terminated. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1826(a)(1).
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prospective and are thus recoverable against state officials because of Ex
parte Young. The distinction between coercive and punitive imprisonment
has been extended to the fine context. A contempt fine is considered civil
and remedial if it either “coerce[s] the defendant into compliance with the
court’s order, [or]. . .compensates the complainant for losses sustained.” 45
Criminal contempt sanctions also consist of fines or imprisonment
but are retrospective because they are determinate and cannot be purged.
Criminal contempt fines are not recoverable against state officials because
of the Eleventh Amendment.
Imprisonment is an appropriate remedy for either civil coercive or
criminal contempt, depending on how it is assessed. If the prison term is
conditional and coercive, the character of the contempt is civil; if it is
backward-looking and unconditional it is criminal. 46 Unlike criminal
contempt where imprisonment and a fine cannot be combined, 47 a finding
of civil contempt allows the coercive imposition of both fine and
imprisonment.
D.

Compensatory Civil Contempt

Compensatory or remedial civil contempt “compensate[s] a party
who has suffered unnecessary injuries or costs because of contemptuous
conduct.” 48 Though compensatory civil contempt proceedings are
nominally those of contempt, they are really proceedings to award
damages to the plaintiff. For this reason, a compensatory fine must rest on
evidence of the injured party’s actual loss. 49 In measuring a compensatory
fine, the actual loss must be directly related to the violation proven. “Like
criminal contempt, remedial civil contempt is backward-looking.” 50 But
remedial contempt is civil because it remedies the consequences of defiant
conduct on an opposing party rather than punishing the defiance per se.
Unlike criminal contempt, however, compensatory civil contempt does
not require mens rea and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 51

45. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947).
46. See Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 366, 368 (holding that prison sentence for two years with
automatic release upon compliance with court’s decree indicated civil contempt).
47. In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943).
48. Travelhost, Inc. v. Blandford, 68 F.3d. 958, 962 (5th Cir. 1996).
49. E.g., United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303-304 (fines here were not intended “to
compensate the complainant for losses sustained”). Coercive civil contempt fines must take into
account the amount of the contemnor’s financial resources.
50. Ingalls v. Thompson (In re Bradley), 588 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2009)
51. See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 193 (1949) (holding that remedial
civil contempt does not require proof of criminal intent).
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Coercive Civil Contempt

Coercive civil contempt fines aim at persuading the contemnor to
obey the injunction. Coercive fines can be purged when the contemnor
obeys the court order. A fixed fine that is imposed and suspended pending
future compliance with the court’s prior orders is considered a purgeable
sanction. 52 The contemnor carries the key to the jail in his own pocket. 53
Unlike compensatory fines, however, coercive fines aim not to determine
what would compensate the plaintiff, but rather the court must determine
what is necessary to force the contemnor into compliance with the
injunction. No matter what, though, coercive fines cannot be used to
enforce the payment of damages.
In United States v. Mine Workers, 54 the Supreme Court squarely
addressed the judicial power to impose coercive civil contempt fines. The
Court ruled that fixed fines may also be deemed purgable and civil when
imposed and suspended pending future compliance.
In Hicks v Feiock, 55 the Supreme Court ruled that in order for a
contempt order imposing a determinate sentence to be civil in nature, it
must contain a purge clause. The two hearings, an initial contempt
proceeding and a purge hearing, are distinct. A purge hearing is not a new
contempt proceeding but a conclusion of the original contempt hearing—
its aim is to determine whether the contemnor has satisfied the purge
conditions. If the original contempt sanction is civil, a purge hearing
retains the civil nature of that proceeding.
1. Overlap Between Compensatory and Coercive Civil Contempt
Evidence of overlap between compensatory and coercive civil
contempt is when both types of fines may serve to compensate the injured
party for losses sustained and coerce the contemnor into compliance with
a previously issued court order. If the case is civil and the punishment is
solely remedial, there is also vindication of the court’s authority. 56

52. Int’l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 823 (1994). (“[F]ixed fines also may be considered
purgable [sic] and civil when imposed and suspended pending future compliance.”) But see Reina v.
United States, 364 U.S. 507, 515 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting with discomfort his opinion
that a suspended civil contempt sentence “seems to represent a present adjudication of guilt for a
crime to be committed in the future”).
53. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911).
54. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
55. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 640 (1988), overruled in part as stated in In re Ivey, 85
Cal. App. 4th 793 (2000).
56. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443.
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2. Criminal Contempt Fines
“Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense.” 57 A fine is
criminal if “the contemnor has no subsequent opportunity to reduce or
avoid the amount of the fine through compliance” (e.g., a per diem fine). 58
Any “flat, unconditional fine” is criminal because it does not afford an
opportunity to purge the contempt through compliance. 59 “A fixed
sentence of imprisonment is punitive and criminal if it is imposed
retrospectively for a ‘completed act of disobedienceFalse’” 60 Criminal
contempt charges can become separate charges from the underlying case.
Criminal contempt charges may live on after resolution of the underlying
case. The purpose of criminal contempt fines (e.g., an unconditional and
determinate fine) is to punish the contemnor and to “vindicate the
authority of the court.” 61 In Hicks v. Feiock, the Supreme Court ruled that
a suspended or probationary sentence is criminal. 62
When a contempt involves the prior conduct of an isolated,
prohibited act, the resulting sanction does not have a coercive effect. “If
the sentence is limited to imprisonment for a definite period, the defendant
is furnished no key, and he cannot shorten the term by promising not to
repeat the offense.” 63
Criminal contempt in federal courts is governed by 18 U.S.C.A §
401, which allows punishment of “[d]isobedience or resistance to” a
court’s “lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.” 64
“Punishment in criminal contempt cannot undo or remedy the thing which
has been done. . . .” 65
As Justice Scalia made clear, concurring in Bagwell:
The criminal contempt sanction, is “punitive, to vindicate the authority
of the court.” Unlike the civil contemnor, who has refused to perform
some discrete, affirmative act commanded by the court . . . the criminal
contemnor has “done that which he has been commanded not to do.”
The criminal contemnor’s disobedience is past, a “completed act” . . .
Accordingly, the criminal contempt sanction operates not to coerce a
future act from the defendant for the benefit of the complainant, but to

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
Int’l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 829 (1994).
Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 588 (1947).
Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828.
Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441.
Hicks, 485 U.S. at 639, note 11.
Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442.
18 U.S.C. § 401 (2002).
In re Fox, 96 F.2d 23, 25(3d Cir. 1938).
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uphold the dignity of the law, by punishing the contemnor’s
disobedience. 66

Criminal contempt proceedings arising out of civil litigation are
between the public and the defendant and are not part of the original
cause. 67 Moreover, criminal contempt requires proof of willfulness while
civil contempt does not. 68
a. Overlap Between Compensatory Civil and Criminal
Contempt
The categories of compensatory civil and criminal contempt are not
altogether neat and tidy. Compensatory “civil contempt proceedings,
although primarily remedial, also ‘vindicate . . . the court’s authority’; and
criminal contempt proceedings, although designed to ‘vindicate the
authority of the law,’ may bestow ‘some incidental benefit’ upon the
complainant, because ‘such punishment tends to prevent a repetition of
the disobedience.’” 69 But such indirect consequences will not change
imprisonment which is merely coercive and remedial, into that which is
solely punitive in character, or vice versa. 70 Despite this overlap, there are
some differences: (1) while the criminal contempt power is limited by 18
U.S.C.A. § 401, civil contempt remains a creature of inherent power. 71 (2)
coercive civil fines cannot be appealed until the end of litigation.72
b. Overlap Between Coercive Civil and Criminal Contempt
The same contemptuous conduct may give rise to both criminal and
coercive civil contempt. 73 In Hicks, the Supreme Court noted:
[W]hen a court imposes fines and punishments on a contemnor, it is not
only vindicating its legal authority to enter the initial court order, but it

66. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 845 (Scalia, J., concurring).
67. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 445.
68. E.g., McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949).
69. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 845.
70. Id. at 828.
71. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990) (referring to “the axiom that courts
have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt”).
72. A trial court’s contempt order is reviewed on appeal with a presumption of correctness and
will not be reversed “unless a clear showing is made that the trial court either abused its discretion ‘or
departed so substantially from the essential requirements of law as to have committed fundamental
error.’” Lewis v. Nical of Palm Beach, Inc., 10 So. 3d 159, 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist., 2009).
73. See In re Marriage of Betts, 558 N.E.2d 404, 431 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
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is also seeking to give effect to the law’s purpose of modifying the
contemnor’s behavior to conform to the terms required in the order. 74

A fine is punitive when it is paid to the court but becomes remedial
or civil when the contemnor can avoid paying the fine simply by
performing the affirmative act required by the court’s order. 75
The Supreme Court in Hicks v. Feilock ruled that conclusions about
the civil or criminal nature of a contempt sanction are properly drawn, not
from “the subjective intent of a State’s laws and its courts,” but “from an
examination of the character of the relief itself.” 76 Because civil contempt
sanctions are deemed non-punitive and avoidable, fewer procedural
protections for such fines are required.
In International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell,
the Supreme Court states, “most contempt sanctions . . . to some extent
punish a prior offense as well as coerce an offender’s future obedience
Justice Scalia noted that the Supreme Court had earlier attempted to
address this issue in Hicks: “A suspended sentence with a term of
probation is not equivalent to a conditional sentence that would allow the
contemnor to avoid or purge these sanctions.” 77
Another example of the overlap between civil coercive and criminal
contempt occurs when the judge levies a fine with a purge clause against
the contemnor but the contemnor never agrees to obey the injunction.
Civil coercive contempt turns into criminal contempt when the judge is
convinced that further fines will not change the contemnor’s mind. At that
point, the judge must impose a determinate and fixed criminal contempt
fine. Similarly, a civil contempt fine cannot extend beyond the point at
which the contemnor can no longer comply with the underlying
injunction. 78
Despite the overlap, differences remain: (1) civil contempt is a facet
of the original cause of action, while criminal contempt is a separate cause
of action brought in the name of the United States; 79 (2) in criminal
contempt, some of the sanctions imposed do not terminate upon the
contemnor’s compliance with the terms of the decree; and (3) one
hallmark of civil contempt is that the sanction imposed is only contingent
and coercive. 80
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Hicks, 485 U.S. at 635.
Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 847 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Hicks, 485 U.S. at 635-36.
Id. at 639.
Id.
Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441-45.
Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 493 F.2d. 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Different Tests for Distinguishing Civil and Criminal Contempt

The courts and commentators have struggled over the years to find a
bright-line test for distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt.81
The following tests have been used:
•

Whether a contempt is civil or criminal turns on the
“character and purpose” of the sanction involved. 82 This test
is easy to state but difficult to put into practice. Rather than
providing a solution, it merely restates the issue.

•

Prohibitory versus mandatory injunctions: In Gompers, the
Supreme Court said that civil contempt seeks to coerce
future compliance with a previously violated mandatory
court order while criminal contempt seeks to punish a past
violation of a prohibitory injunction. 83 The problem with this
test is that most injunctions can be manipulated to appear
either prohibitory or mandatory. 84 The distinction between
mandatory and prohibitory is difficult to apply “when
conduct that can recur is involved, or when an injunction
contains both mandatory and prohibitory provisions.” 85

•

Focus on the severity of the sanctions imposed.86 The more
severe the sanction, the more likely it is criminal contempt.

•

Favor civil sanctions over criminal fines in order to apply the
least amount of power possible required to the proposed end.
Dictum in an 1821 Supreme Court case, Anderson v. Dunn, 87
requires the choice of civil sanctions over criminal where
feasible. The problem with this test is that civil sanctions
often impose greater burdens on the contemnor than criminal
ones.

81. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 839-40 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our cases have employed a variety
of not easily reconcilable tests for differentiating between civil and criminal contempts.”).
82. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441.
83. Id. at 443.
84. E.g., Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 835 (An injunction ordering the union: “Do not strike,” would
appear to be prohibitory and criminal, while an injunction ordering the union: “Continue working,”
would be mandatory and civil.”).
85. Id. at 835.
86. Id. (Where “a serious contempt is at issue, considerations of efficiency must give way to
the more fundamental interest of ensuring the evenhanded exercise of judicial power.”).
87. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821).
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•

When both civil and criminal relief is imposed, “the criminal
feature of the order is dominant and fixes its character for
purposes of review.” 88

•

When sanctions are announced in advance, such sanctions
are coercive and civil, not criminal. Just because a court
establishes a prospective fine schedule does not make the
fines civil. Also, at the outset of the proceeding, the judge
has not yet heard evidence about the contempt. A judge
cannot decide on a sanction before the proceeding without
offending due process.

•

Bagwell factors: In Bagwell, the majority opinion set forth
several factors that identify a contempt sanction as criminal:
(1) did the contemnor’s sanctionable conduct implicate the
court’s ability to maintain order and adjudicate the
proceedings before it?; (2) did the contemnor’s contumacy
involve simple, affirmative acts?; 89 (3) did the court levy
contempt fines for widespread, ongoing, out-of-the-court
violations of a complex injunction? If so, the sanction is
criminal. 90

•

Focus on the motivation of the contumacy: Justices Black
and Douglas, dissenting in United Mine Workers, 91
suggested that the choice between civil and criminal
sanctions should take account of “the question of intent—the
motivation of the contumacy.” Where the contemnor
believes in good faith, though erroneously, that he was
acting within his legal rights, the fine is civil. If the
contemnor acted in bad faith, the fine is criminal.

•

Disobedience of a court order amounts to civil contempt,
while acts hindering the administration of justice are
criminal.

88. Hicks, 485 U.S. at 638 n.10.
89. Id. at 842 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“When an order governs many aspects of a litigant’s
activities, rather than just a discrete act, determining compliance becomes much more difficult.
Credibility issues arise, for which the fact-finding protections of the criminal law (including jury trial)
become much more important.”).
90. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 838.
91. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 333 (1947).
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•

The trial court judge controls the nature of the contempt fine
imposed. This is an overstatement—the contemnor controls
whether to obey the injunction.

•

Contempt fines that contain a purge clause are always civil. 92
For example, in United States v. Mine Workers, the Supreme
Court imposed and suspended a coercive civil fine,
conditioned on the union’s ability to purge the fine through
full, timely compliance with the trial court’s order. The
Court concluded, in light of the purge clause, that the civil
fine operated as “a coercive imposition upon the defendant
union to compel obedience with the court’s outstanding
order.” 93

•

Ancillary monetary relief can only be awarded in civil
contempt but not in criminal contempt. Funds are simply
ancillary to a valid, prospective injunction. This is a
compelling argument but courts hotly debate what
constitutes ancillary monetary relief.

•

Ongoing violations versus completed violations: ongoing
violations calls for coercive civil contempt while completed
violations call for criminal contempt. 94 The Eleventh
Amendment allows prospective equitable relief to end
continuing violations of federal law.

•

Abolish the distinction between civil and criminal
contempt. 95 Commentators argue that contempt generally,
whether civil or criminal, is sufficiently serious that
contemnors should be entitled to all the constitutional
protections afforded criminal defendants. Adopting this
approach would mean that contempt fines would never be
recoverable from a state official because criminal contempt

92. See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966) (upholding as civil a
determinate (two year) sentence which includes a purge clause”).
93. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 307.
94. See, e.g. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 842 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Where specific performance of
contracts was sought, it was the categorical rule that no decree would issue that required ongoing
supervision.”).
95. Paul A. Grote, Purging Contempt: Eliminating the Distinction between Civil and Criminal
Contempt, 88 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 1247, 1275 (2011) (“Generally, all indirect contempts should be
treated like former indirect criminal contempts.”).
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fines are barred by the Eleventh Amendment as they are
always retrospective.
One approach for distinguishing civil and criminal contempt would
be to apply as many of these tests as feasible and if all of them point in
the same direction, courts may rest assured that they have arrived at the
correct one. Another possible solution, as it relates to the Eleventh
Amendment’s ban on retrospective fines, is for the judge to only impose
a jail sentence instead of any fines. Jail time, rarely, if ever, entails
requiring the state to pay money out of the state treasury. In conclusion,
the ongoing debate surrounding the three types of contempt and the
Eleventh Amendment is unlikely to be settled until the Supreme Court
arms lower courts with more helpful guidance.

